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Armand Ciavatta, the son of a working-class Italian-American family fro
was a born inventor.  Interviewed at age 76, he said he still has ideas for inventio
found the time to develop.  While working as a research program manager for I
New Jersey-based manufacturer of heavy equipment, he submitted a dozen
products to the hierarchy at the research facility where he worked.  The compan
them.  After Ciavatta was fired in a dispute with a higher-up over the quality 
stabilizer for which Ciavatta was the manufacturing manager, he had an idea 
stabilizer.  Now unemployed, Ciavatta went back to tinkering in his home. 
prototype stabilizer with kitchen utensils borrowed from his wife and the 
neighborhood boy.  Investing his life savings along with money borrowed from
his brother, Ciavatta patented his stabilizer and he started his own small busin
invention.  When Ciavatta’s invention proved a success in the marketplace, Ing
to force him to relinquish the patent. Though Ingersoll-Rand claimed th
improperly used information gained during his employment there, Ciavatta eve
litigation battle in a unanimous decision of the New Jersey Supreme Court.1  Bu
as Ing
 of Ciavatta’s career, and he suffered the fate of long-term unemployment no
a middle-aged engineer who suddenly found himself out of work.  As for Ing
denouement of the story isn’t much happier.  The company eventually disban
and development facility where Ciavatta had worked and ultimately gave up m
business. 
 
Ciavatta’s story is not unique.  Many inventors believe that their former
tell a story of a bureaucratic research and development culture that fails to stim
reward innovation.  Some become frustrated and go out on their own to work
idea.  When the idea succeeds, as the employees tell it, the employer suddenly
invention should be pursued and demands the former employee assign the pa
These employees understandably see the employer’s behavior as opportun
 
1 Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. Ciavatta, 542 A.2d 879 (N.J. 1988). 
2 Other leading cases raising similar issues include: Wommack v. Durham Pecan Co., 715 F.2d 962 (5th Cir. 1983) 
(granting shop right to employer of general laborer whose duties included unloading trucks and sweeping floors for  
an invention for removing worms from pecans because laborer developed patented process at work); Francklyn v. 
Guilford Packing Co., 695 F.2d 1158 (9th Cir. 1983) (granting employer shop right to device for harvesting clams 
invented by fisherman); Dewey v. Am. Stair Glide Corp., 557 S.W.2d 643 (Mo. Ct. App. 1977) (rejecting 
employer’s claim to shop right due to evidence of an express prohibition against working on a device for solving a 
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Petr Taborsky, for example, made national headlines in 1997 when he
rather than comply with a court order that he hand over his laboratory notebook
to an invention he developed in his spare time while a student at the University 
Taborsky had taken a job in 1987 for $8.50 an hour working as a lab technician
to help pay his tuition.  He was originally assigned to work on a project in whi
had contracted with the local power company to develop a process for removing
clay used to filter water.  The power company terminated the project when th
unable to solve the problem, and Taborsky was reassigned to menial jobs around
by sources other than the power company contract.  But Taborsky was determ
problem even without the support of his employer.  Working after hours for mon
Taborsky eventually devised a solution to the problem.  Unsurprisingly, both th
the power company became interested and insisted that the power company ow
Because he worked as an employee of the university, Taborsky would get 
discovery.    Taborsky took his lab notebooks and dropped out of school.  The p
the lab got the university police to confiscate Taborsky’s lab notebooks an
criminally prosecuted and convicted of theft of 
 developed.  Undaunted, Taborsky patented his invention.  In his view, it 
steal his own ideas and the results of work he had done on his own time aft
director had abandoned the project.  The trial judge saw it differently, and senten
prison, where he worked on a chain gang for two months.3   
 
of Petr Taborsky’s and Armand Ciavatta’s convictions about owning their ideas
patent ownership extends beyond simple economic analysis.  It is about dignita
issues as well.  For these and other inventors, control over their patents is c
creativity, and owning their patents is often as much about receiving credit for th
                                                                                                                                  
ntirely at home and 
sh. 2000) (entitling 
oped by former lab 
sonite Corp., 507 P.2d 1119 (Colo. Ct. App. 1973) (granting 
ntions on work time 
not hired to invent); 
urer shop right to an 
echanical engineer 
ghts to Inventions 
8 AIPLA Q.J. 127 (1990); Steven Cherensky, Comment, A 
Penny for Their Thoughts:  Employee-Inventors, Preinvention Assignment Agreements, Property, and Personhood, 
81 Cal. L. Rev. 595 (1993); Marc B. Hershovitz, Note, Unhitching the Trailer Clause:  The Rights of Inventive 
Employees and Their Employers, 3 J. Intell. Prop. L. 187 (1995). 
3 Leon Jaroff, Intellectual Chain Gang, Time Magazine, Feb. 10, 1997, at 64 (detailing Taborsky’s invention and 
incarcertaion); Dateline: Taking Liberty?  Man Goes to Prison to Fight His Right (NBC television broadcast Dec. 
12, 1999) (recounting Taborsky’s story); Greg Saitz, Inventor Squares Off with Employer, Times-Picayune, Jan. 10, 
2002, at 3 (reporting on employee inventor fired from M&M/Mars candy company for refusing to assign patent to 
invention for spray paint can).  See generally David F. Noble, America By Design:  Science, Technology, and the 
Rise of Corporate Capitalism (1977) (recounting criticisms of alleged anti-competitive and innovation-stifling 
consequences of corporate control of patents to employee inventions). 
problem of falling Stair Glide chair elevators and evidence that the invention was devised e
during employee’s lunch hour); Waterjet Tech.,Inc. v. Flow Int’l Co., 996 P.2d 598 (Wa
employer to a patent over the method and apparatus for using high-pressure waterjet devel
technician and associate engineer); Hewett v. Sam
employer shop right to patents for improved luggage invented by foreman who designed inve
using company material but denying employer ownership of the patent because employee was 
Crowe v. M & M/Mars, 577 A.2d 1278 (N.J. Super. App. Div. 1990) (granting candy manufact
improved pump that could be used for spraying coating on chocolate candy invented by m
employed as independent contractor). See Paul C. Van Slyke & Mark M. Friedman, Employer’s Ri
and Patents of its Officers, Directors, and Employees, 1
CATHERINE L. FISK   
 
3
dignity, self-respect, and 
auto ights.   
  Innovation is 
omplex modern 
p new products.  
vention to which 
tled to resist that 
 South Florida’s 
university to all 
s.  We own it.”  
ns, no employee 
 employee who 
 the creative and 
d to be possibly 
pany and other 
 not necessarily 
r Ciavatta’s claims) to have done their work after hours or after quitting or being 
fired.  Moreover, aside from a university’s concerns as employer, there is the question of a 
uni l scientists who 
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 from benefiting 
is about money.  Just as employment for most people is as much about 
nomy as it is about a paycheck, so, too, is control over intellectual property r
 
From the employer’s point of view, of course, it’s a different story.
notoriously expensive and difficult, particularly in those fields where c
technology requires the sustained inventive efforts of many people to develo
When one employee claims as his own all the profit and all the credit for an in
many of his co-workers and predecessors at the firm contributed, the firm is enti
opportunism by insisting that the patent and the profits should belong to the firm that fostered the 
culture and financed the work.  From the point of view of the University of
general counsel, the contract between Taborsky and the university entitled the 
his inventions. As she put it, “It is irrelevant to us who invented the proces
Employers are worried that if employees can claim the results of their inventio
would ever admit to having an inventive idea during working hours. Any
developed an idea on the job, even with the financial assistance of the firm and
technical assistance of co-workers, would quit as soon as the invention appeare
profitable, claiming sole credit for work when it should be shared with the com
employees.  Employers tend to doubt the veracity of employee claims (though
Taborsky’s o
versity’s concerns as a producer of scientific knowledge.  Should individua
produce major breakthroughs in important scientific problems be able to claim
themselves, thereby using intellectual property law to exclude other scientists
from their work?  
me increasingly 
 enforcement of 
out reconciling 
ativity should be 
 and corporate 
ployees for the 
 sign a contract 
road a range of 
 
ployee’s term of 
he slightly more 
tracts, variously 
known as “invention assignment agreements” or “holdover clauses” or “trailer clauses,” also 
claim as firm property any invention the employee might make that has any relationship to the 
firm’s business or, less frequently, to the business of the firm’s subsidiaries and affiliated 
companies.  Armand Ciavatta’s contract, for example, claimed for Ingersoll-Rand all inventions 
that might have anything to do with the company’s twenty diverse subsidiaries and affiliates, 
regardless of whether Ciavatta had any contact with the affiliates or their work.  In other words, 
since one Ingersoll-Rand subsidiary manufactured the Kryptonite bicycle lock, if Ciavatta had 
invented a new bike lock, the contract would have covered it even though Ciavatta never had a 
 
As these disputes filter through litigation, employment contracts beco
important. In addition to their significance to the legal issues, interpretation and
these contracts will shape the ethical, economic, and political debates ab
individual creativity with collaborative work, about how credit and profit for cre
allocated, and about desirable incentives for individual entrepreneurship
investment in research and development (R & D). Most inventors work as em
majority of their careers and are often required as a condition of employment to
drafted by the firm’s lawyers giving the firm exclusive control over as b
economically valuable information and innovation that the lawyers think is legally feasible. 
Such contracts typically claim as firm property—both during and after an em
employment—the nebulous category of “proprietary information,” along with t
clearly (though still poorly) defined category of “trade secrets.”  These con
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In short, opportunistic behavior by employees is 
con
te who wins and 
ses these disputes when they come to litigation, many courts have tried to carve a middle 
path by insisting that reasonable contracts will be enforced.  Ingersoll-Rand v. Ciavatta was one 
such case. 
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skilled labor, technological sophistication, and investment capital.  Acquisition of technology, 
of people skilled 
 the development 
raging invention 
ives of ordinary 
thin  to do with that line of business.  g
fronted by contractual overreaching by employers.   
 
Reluctant simply to let the market power of one party or the other dicta
who lo
Social Background 
 
 Among the statutes enacted by the first Congress of the United States wa
of 1790.  Congress accorded patent protection high priority because of the wides
intellectual property protections were essential to stimulate invention, and
necessary to economic development.  Many, perhaps most, early nineteenth ce
worked alone or with a few others in a small workshop in a town or village or 
technology was relatively simple and thus it was possible for skilled craftspeo
laborers to understand the technology behind the devices that they used and to fi
epreneurial in the sense that many people with inventive talent had a rea
becoming inventors, owning a patent, and being able to profit from their paten
either manufacturing and selling it themselves or by assigning or licensing the p
who could.4 
 
 The early United States was a country obsessed with the need for 
whether by importation from Europe or invention in America, and immigration 
enough to use and develop technology were widely considered to be essential to
of the country.  Both political leaders and local business folk thought that encou
would lead to economic development that would dramatically improve the l
                                                 
4 The history of American technological innovation and corporate R & D in this and following 
from Thomas Hughes, American Genesis:  A Century of Innovation and Technological Ent
(1989); Joel Mokyr, The Lever of Riches:  Technological Creativity and Economic Progress (1
Atar, Trade Secrets:  Intellectual Piracy and the Origins of American Industrial Power (2004); 
Democratization of Invention:  Patents and Copyrights in American Economic Development,
Steven Lubar, The Transformation of Antebellum Patent
paragraphs is drawn 
husiasm, 1870-1970 
990); Doron S. Ben-
B. Zorina Khan, The 
 1790-1920 (2005); 
 Law, 32 Tech. & Culture 932 (1991); Walter Licht, 
Industrializing America:  The Nineteenth Century (1995); David A. Hounshell & John Kenly Smith, Jr., Science and 
Corporate Strategy:  Du Pont R&D, 1902-1980 (1980); Naomi R. Lamoreaux & Kenneth L. Sokoloff, Inventors, 
Firms, and the Market for Technology in the Late Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Century United States, in 
Learning By Doing in Markets, Firms, and Countries (Naomi R. Lamoreaux, Daniel M.G. Raff & Peter Temin, eds., 
1999); David F. Noble, America By Design:  Science, Technology, and the Rise of Corporate Capitalism (1977); 
Leonard S. Reich, The Making of American Industrial Research:  Science and Business at GE and Bell, 1876-1926 
(1985).  For a full history of the law governing employee inventors see Catherine L. Fisk, Removing the ‘Fuel of 
Interest’ from the ‘Fire of Genius’:  Law and the Employee-Inventor, 1830-1930, 65 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1127 (1998); 
Catherine L. Fisk, Working Knowledge:  Trade Secrets, Restrictive Covenants in Employment, and the Rise of 
Corporate Intellectual Property, 1800-1920, 52 Hastings L.J. 441 (2001). 
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unprecedented in 
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atentees became 
d than they were 
 in 1870 to 64% 
loyees requiring 
ar I but became 
routine in the twentieth century.  The explosive growth of corporate research and development 
dramatically changed both the environment in which workplace innovation occurred and how the 
lay and legal public imagined invention.  In the popular and judicial imagination, perhaps more 
than in actual fact, the hero inventor experimenting alone in his laboratory or workshop ceded his 
place to company men in laboratory coats working collaboratively—and on a corporate 
payroll—to advance the progress of technology.  Legal doctrine changed accordingly, with 
twentieth century courts becoming far more likely than their nineteenth century predecessors to 
conclude either that employees were hired to invent, and the firm therefore owned all employee 
people and increase the wealth of the nation.  Consequently, the Framers of 
empowered Congress to enact patent and copyright laws “To promote the Pro
and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the ex
their respective Writings and Discoveries.”  Technological innovation, both in
inventions made in the U.S. or patented technologies imported from Europe, wer
by every possible means.  And by the late nineteenth century, the ef
 being technologically backward and a net consumer of intellectua
technological leader and exporter of intellectual property to Europe and the worl
 
 As the nineteenth century wore on, technology grew more complex and
resources to innovate in economically significant ways.  While many people wit
ability, education, skill, and access to a workshop might have been able to desi
improvement to the relatively simple steam engines of the early nineteenth centu
the century only those with highly specialized knowledge of metals and mechan
who had access to a locomotive and several miles of railroad track would be
patent a major improvement.  While crucial technology grew exponentially mor
and factories grew larger.  Opportunities for individual invention and entreprene
ntieth century that an inventor would be an employee of a large corporatio
other employees using the tools and material of his employer to develop a p
became less democratic and entrepreneurial at the individual level.  Both
entrepreneurship became corporate. 
 
 In the two decades bracketing the turn of the twentieth century, many
firms founded research and development facilities.  In 1902, Du Pont founded a
& D operation that produced innovations in explosives (the company’s origin
eventually in plastics, artificial fibers, and chemicals.  In the same period,
founded the famed Bell Laboratories, the Eastman-Kodak Company establ
produced major innovations in photographic film and printing, and General Ele
research facility that produced major innovations in electricity.   Many othe
approached research and development with a degree of sophistication that was 
the U.S.  Along with a transformation in industrial research came a transfo
research and development employees were managed.  Between 1870 and 1910, p
more likely to assign away rights to their patents at the time the patent was issue
before.  Assignments to corporations jumped from 24% of recorded assignments
of recorded assignments in 1910.  Contracts between firms and their emp
employees to assign all patents to the firm were relatively rare until World W
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umbers of employees and insisting that workers should be much more entrepreneurial.  
As ting 40,000 jobs, 
 this company to 
ork force being 
 begun to worry 
eliver innovation 
ents to the firm, 
pted a variety of 
 work produced 
 were either too small or too arbitrary to provide adequate 
incentives. [source?] As anxiety about the success of R & D at large corporations grew, a new, 
different, and wildly successful phenomenon emerged in Silicon Valley.  Silicon Valley was 
characterized by rapid innovation, extraordinary levels of mobility among highly educated 
eneurship among 
ad not been seen since the nineteenth century.   The Silicon Valley 
ays of R & D at 
                                                
paten
nts. 
 
 The growth of corporate R & D was but one facet of a dramatic chan
business generally over the course of the early twentieth century.  Cor
exponentially in size.  As a result, the management of the tens of thousands of
white collar workers employed in the behemoth firms became ever more 
bureaucratic.  The rise of managerial capitalism in the mid-century meant that inven
ead to be mid-level quasi-managerial employees of a research division of a l
But the era when employees were not expected to be individually entrepreneurial
 
By the mid-1980s, the link between job stability and innovation began to
stability of corporate jobs was disappearing as firms faced new global 
unprecedented pressure from Wall Street to reduce labor costs.  Suddenly, firm
offered stable jobs in exchange for the long-term loyalty of their employees b
massive n
the Vice President of Human Resources at AT&T said in 1996 when elimina
“People need to look at themselves as self-employed, as vendors who come to
sell their skills . . . . [W]e have to promote the whole concept of the w
contingent.”5 
 
 By the late 1980s, scholars of innovation and economic development had
about the ability of managerial capitalism and corporate R & D to continue to d
and economic growth.  Firms had long worried about how to provide incentives for employees to 
innovate since individual employees, who typically were required to assign pat
no longer stood to profit from their patents.  Beginning in the 1940s, firms ado
bonus systems that promised modest financial rewards for employees whose
patents, but these bonus schemes often
technology workers, constant start-ups of new firms, and a degree of entrepr
technology employees that h
phenomenon caused both scholars and business people to wonder whether the d
large and bureaucratic firms were numbered.6     
 
 
5 Edmund L. Andrews, Don’t Go Away Mad, Just Go Away:  Can AT&T Be the Nice Guy As It Cuts 40,000 Jobs? 
N.Y. Times, Feb. 13, 1996, at D1, D6.  See also Catherine L. Fisk, Knowledge Work:  New Metaphors for a New 
Economy, 80 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 839 (2005). 
6 See Eric Von Hippel, Democratizing Innovation (2005); Eric Von Hippel, The Sources of Innovation (1988); Joel 
Mokyr, The Lever of Riches: Technological Creativity and Economic Progress (1990); David C. Mowery & Nathan 
Rosenberg, Technology and the Pursuit of Economic Growth (1989); AnnaLee Saxenian, Regional Advantage:  
Culture and Competition in Silicon Valley and Route 128 (1994). 
CATHERINE L. FISK 
 
  7
rly 1980s at the 
y developments.  
orporate jobs for 
ment was likely 
come or remain 
 feel significant 
orporate R & D 
ave become too 
 impact of these 
.  Although the 
d by firms for 
rized by internal 
ably gummed up 
 to drive rapid 
of the unemployed middle-aged engineer who sought to 
remake himself as an entrepreneur competing with one of the giants of American industry 
presented a particularly juicy challenge for a court to sort out.  The case invited the court to craft 
legal doctrine capable of dealing with some of the most salient and pressing issues at the 
inte
e the first Patent 
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 devices (such as 
nt application must describe 
the ts the statutory 
true inventor.  A 
 the manufacture 
d to enable any 
thereby allowing 
later inventors to come up with new ideas for improvements over existing patents.8 
 
d by employees.  
 law governs the 
e person identified in the patent application as 
the true inventor is an employee, the law of employment governs the rights to the patent.  
Beginning in the late eighteenth century, the patent law requirement that the “true inventor” be 
listed in the application encouraged the notion that an individual person was both the inventor 
                                                
 Thus, Armand Ciavatta’s fight against Ingersoll-Rand occurred in the ea
convergence of a number of significant real-world, academic, and public polic
He was the company man who was fired by a firm at a time at which stable c
middle-aged employees were becoming harder to find and long-term unemploy
to be a particularly severe problem for a group who had not expected to be
unemployed mid-career.7 Layoffs occurred because firms were beginning to
pressure from Wall Street to reduce labor costs in order to boost share prices.  C
departments were often targeted because they were perceived by cost-cutters to h
bureaucratic, too cautious, and insufficiently creative and entrepreneurial. The
job losses was exacerbated by the contracts departing employees had signed
holdover agreements, restrictive covenants, and other contractual devices use
security were well-suited to prevent opportunistic quits in a workplace characte
labor markets and implicit promises of job security, those same devices conceiv
the works of the highly mobile and productive labor market that seemed
innovation in Silicon Valley.  The plight 
rsection of American business and technology. 
 
 
Legal Background 
 
 Although United States patent laws have been revised significantly sinc
Act of 1790, most of the basics have not changed.  The government may, upon a
a patent for an invention it deems new and useful.  Patentable inventions can be
a better mousetrap) as well as processes (such as a recipe).  A pate
invention with reasonable specificity, must explain how the invention mee
requirements of being novel, useful, and non-obvious, and must identify the 
patent lasts for a term of years and entitles the patent owner to a monopoly for
of the patented device.  The patent application is a public disclosure designe
person to read the patent and see how the patented device or process works, 
Federal patent law says nothing about ownership of patents produce
While the Patent Act provides for the assignment of a patent upon issuance, state
validity of assignments.  When the patentee or th
 
7 On the phenomenon of restructuring or opportunistic firings unsettling the individual and social expectations of the 
career employee, see chapter one of this volume by Professor Grodin. 
8 On the general requirements of modern patent law, see Janice M. Mueller, An Introduction to Patent Law (2003); 
Roger E. Schechter & John R. Thomas, Principles of Patent Law (2004). 
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character of the nineteenth century law of employee inventions may be attributed both to the pre-
ind e early Industrial 
ical change and 
e relatively pro-
n as the “shop 
oyer’s tools was 
cense to use and 
Originally, the shop right was a sort of equitable estoppel, existing 
only where the employee had allowed the employer to use the invention in the business and then 
late  longer required.  
non-transferable, 
ld or liquidated, 
ieth century, the 
to conclude that 
ad been hired to 
invent or on a contract assigning future inventions.  Undergirding this judicial receptivity was the 
thought that, even where an employee was clearly the originator of an idea, employers could still 
justly own employee patents because the employee’s idea would be worth little without the 
 Reasoning that 
ntion is a long and arduous endeavor to which many employees contribute while on the 
firm’s payroll and not solely the product of a stroke of individual genius, courts tended to find 
the public interest to lie not in the individual employee owning the patent but in corporate 
                                                
and the proper owner of the patent.  One of the common grounds for attacking 
Office’s decision to award a patent or the patent’s validity when defending ag
patent infringement was to assert that the patentee was not the true or first inve
structure thus invited patentees to identify, in their legal documents and in thei
invention as the product of one individual’s effort rather than the collectiv
collaborative workshop.  For this and other reasons the default rule during the ni
was that any invention that an employee patented belonged to the employe
whether the employee had made the invention at work.  Occasionally, employer
thought to agree in advance on who would own patents to workplace inventio
either very narrowly interpreted or declined to enforce agreements to assign fut
the employer.  The rationale for both the default rule of employee ownershi
interpretation of pre-invention assignment agreements was a sense of both the
and instrumen
ustrial tradition of craft autonomy and control over craft knowledge and to th
Revolution’s ideology that the genius inventor was the catalyst of technolog
economic growth.9 
 
 In the latter half of the century, courts made limited incursions on th
employee law.  First, courts developed a doctrine that eventually became know
right” rule.  An employee who developed an invention at work using the empl
still entitled to the patent, but the law gave the employer a shop right—a free li
to manufacture the invention.  
r tried to restrict its use.  Eventually, the employee’s acquiescence was no
The shop right also expanded over time. When first conceived, the right was 
such that an employer could not sell the shop right, and if the business were so
the shop right was not transferred with the other business assets.  In the twent
shop right became a transferable asset. 
 
 Around the turn of the twentieth century, courts became more willing 
employers owned employee patents based either on a finding that an employee h
firm’s investment that created value in the idea and brought it to market. 
inve
 
9 The legal change described in this and the following paragraphs is detailed in Catherine L. Fisk, Removing the 
‘Fuel of Interest’ from the ‘Fire of Genius’:  Law and the Employee-Inventor, 1830-1930, 65 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1127 
(1998). 
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trade secrets and 
s will prevent an 
or competitive 
ay enter 
 to prevent the 
d the restrictive 
prevent former employees from using knowledge gained at work can stifle competition, prevent 
the t and innovation 
y.  On the other 
hand, courts also recognize that, to provide adequate incentives for firms to invest in the 
in new technologies, the law should allow  some 
contractual or default rule protection against employees opportunistically quitting their jobs 
before the employer has had the chance to recoup its investment in the employee’s training or 
other development of human capital.   
 
Most twentieth-century courts developed a variety of multi-factor balancing tests to 
mediate the disputes over trade secrets and non-compete agreements, and the balancing tests 
                                                
control.  “Protection for the future requires that inventi
ermined and diverted by other inventions along the same line.”  
 
 Over the course of the twentieth century, the law of employee invento
three doctrinal categories.  First, the default rule was that employees not hire
invent owned the patents to all their inventions, regardless of when or whe
conceived or developed the invention.  Second, if the employee used wo
employer’s facilities to develop the invention, the law gave the employer a s
invention, but the employee could still license or sell the patent to others or
market the invention herself.  Third, firms and employees could contract around 
of employee ownership and shop right in two ways.  First, an employer who hi
specifically on the understanding that the employee’s job was to invent would 
patents produced in the scope of the employment contract.  In this sense, 
contract of a hiring to invent was deemed to overcome the default rule.  A
employer could contract around the default rule by requiring that all patents 
employee might make during or for some period after the employment would b
property and that the employee would be obligated to assign them.  This last cate
employer the broadest rights to emplo
he employee’s work.  Ingersoll-Rand v. Ciavatta presented a question ab
such pre-invention assignment agreements.  Could an employer require an em
the patent to any invention on any topic the employee might ever acquire for the r
life?  If not, what are the limits of such contracts? 
 
 The law of employee inventors developed on a parallel track with two ot
governing rights to economically valuable workplace knowledge:  the law of 
the law of restrictive covenants.  As explained in chapter six of this book, court
employee from using economically valuable knowledge in subsequent 
employment when the knowledge qualifies as a trade secret.  In addition, an employer m
into a “restrictive covenant” or “noncompete agreement” with an employee
employee from engaging in competitive employment.  In both the trade secret an
covenant areas, courts recognize that excessively broad protection for the employer’s desire to 
employee from finding employment, and retard the economic developmen
that comes from the diffusion of talent and knowledge throughout the econom
development of human capital and to invest 
 
10 Nat’l Wire Bound Box Co. v. Healy, 189 F. 49, 55 (7th Cir. 1911). 
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est in restricting 
nal scope of the 
her employment 
rough employee 
rding employee 
restrictions that 
entions in these 
licy grounds to 
hout limit on the 
enforceability of 
 relating to the 
the law of trade 
ave little explicit 
Court’s decision 
ade secrets and 
ising a rule about the permissible scope of invention assignment 
.  Whether explicitly, as in Ingersoll-Rand v. Ciavatta, or implicitly, as in many other 
states, all three areas of law  rules to regulate the labor market with an eye 
toward fostering the optimal level of innovation consistent with the dignitary and economic 
inte
 and diversified 
ray of machinery 
ries.  “We are not a 
glam 14  But when the 
construction and 
mining equipment seemed quite glamorous, as it furnished the machines that built the 
Times obituary of 
drill which made 
 in progress.”15 
a number of inventor-
umen into a very successful business 
                                                
generally focus on the nature and extent of the employer’s legitimate inter
employees’ use of knowledge, the proper geographic, temporal, and occupatio
restriction on competitive work, the hardship on the employee of limiting his or 
opportunities, and the public interest in either the free diffusion of knowledge th
mobility or the restriction on competition.  Some courts treat contracts rega
inventions, however, without the special reasonableness and public policy 
dominate in trade secret and non-compete cases; contracts to assign future inv
courts are enforced like any other contract.11  Some courts refuse on public po
enforce pre-invention assignment agreements that are without time limit and wit
subject matter of inventions covered.12 A few states have statutes limiting the 
pre-invention assignment agreements; under such statutes only inventions
employee’s job may be subject to compulsory assignment.13  In most states, 
secrets, the law of restrictive covenants, and the law of employee inventions h
doctrinal overlap.  Indeed, one of the novel features of the New Jersey Supreme 
in Ingersoll-Rand v. Ciavatta was its liberal borrowing from the law of tr
restrictive covenants in dev
agreements
 attempt to devise
rests of the inventive employee. 
  
 
Factual Background 
 
 The Ingersoll-Rand Company, headquartered in New Jersey, is a large
company that manufactures heavy equipment, power tools, locks, and a wide ar
and parts for the auto, construction, and industrial equipment indust
orous company,” quipped the company chairman to Forbes in 1993.
company was founded, its emphasis on designing and building drills and 
infrastructure of America and some of the rest of the world.  As the New York 
one company founder breathlessly explained, “It was his development of the 
possible many of the great engineering feats of the last century and those now
 
The company was founded in the late nineteenth century by 
business acentrepreneurs who parlayed their inventions and 
 
11 See, e.g., Cubic Corp. v. Marty, 229 Cal. Rptr. 828 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986) (enforcing agreement to assign invention 
developed during term of employment and relating to employee’s work); Shaw v. Regents of Univ. of Calif., 67 Cal. 
Rptr. 2d 850 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997) (stating that invention assignment agreement is a contract and therefor, unlike 
other employment policies, it cannot be unilaterally modified). 
12 See, e.g., Guth v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 72 F.3d 385, 388 (7th Cir. 1934). 
13 See, e.g., Cal. Lab. Code § 2870 (assignment agreement covering inventions developed without employer 
resources or unconnected to employer’s work is, with some exceptions, unenforceable). 
14 Paul Klebnikov, A Traumatic Experience, Forbes, Jan. 18, 1993, at 83. 
15 Obituary, Henry C. Sergeant, N.Y. Times, Feb. 1, 1907, at 9. 
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 patented a rock 
ts to the firm he 
enerated by the 
 Clark Sergeant 
vation that made 
ntions, and that 
gersoll-Sergeant 
eanwhile, brothers Albert, Jasper, and 
Addison Rand founded a firm specializing in mining work based on their own, independent drill 
tech ncement of the 
ersoll-Rand was 
 its founder with 
the marketplace.  
dership’s strong 
for the corporate 
pride:  An 1887 Scientific American article on the construction of the New York Aqueduct reads 
like e construction of 
unnel (then the 
 Rushmore.  Just 
en invention and 
sses, the history 
tory of the large, 
n whose fate was linked 
to t pany employed 
a solid return on 
y as a whole) in 
the 1970s.  The men who ran the company had spent their careers there, rising through the 
vatta enjoyed an 
rmed competently.   
 enjoyed record 
y had a bad year 
tumbled and orders fell.  In 12 months in 1982 and early 1983, the 
                                                
based on new technology using compressed air.  Simon Ingersoll invented and
drill that became the foundation of the company’s business.  He sold the paten
founded in 1871.  He himself never enjoyed a large share of the wealth g
company that bore his name because he had sold his patents to the firm.  Henry
received over sixty patents for various inventions and is credited with the inno
the rock-drill successful.  He formed his own company to market his inve
company eventually merged with the Ingersoll Drill Company in 1888; the In
Company specialized in tunnel driving and quarrying.  M
nology.  When Ingersoll-Sergeant merged with Rand in 1905, the annou
merger focused on the uniting of the patents as much as anything else.16 
 
 The early history of the companies that eventually united to form Ing
characterized by the ability of each firm to combine the mechanical ingenuity of
the business acumen necessary to make the patented inventions a success in 
For decades, it was a firm that prided itself on its employees’ and lea
combination of engineering talent and business savvy.  And there was reason 
 an advertisement for Ingersoll drills.  Ingersoll-Rand drills were used on th
the New York Subway, the Panama Canal, the Hoover Dam, the Cascade T
longest mountain railroad tunnel on the North American continent), and on Mt.
as notably, Ingersoll-Rand patented the original jackhammer.17 
 
 If the early success of the firm exemplified the happy marriage betwe
entrepreneurship that characterized many nineteenth century technology busine
of the firm in the middle decades of the twentieth century exemplified the life s
vertically-integrated, and massively diversified manufacturing corporatio
he fortunes of American manufacturing, construction, and mining.  The com
about 47,000 people and reported sales of $3.4 billion in 1982.  It enjoyed 
equity even as its stock price fluctuated a bit (along with the American econom
ranks.18  It was the kind of place where white-collar workers like Armand Cia
implicit understanding of lifetime employment so long as they perfo
 
In the early 1980s, that abruptly changed.  In 1981, Ingersoll-Rand
earnings of $9.71 per share, which was up 21 percent over 1980. But the compan
in 1982.   Its stock price 
 
16 George Koether, The Building of Men, Machines, and a Company (1971);  Obituary,  Henry C. Sergeant, N.Y. 
Times, Feb. 1, 1907, at 9; Johannes H. Wisby, Compressed Air, L.A. Times, Nov. 19, 1899, at A10. 
17 Ingersoll-Rand Co., The Story of the Hoover Dam (1932-1936); Charles W. Hobart, The Cascade Tunnel and the 
Man That Made It, 13 Mag. W. Hist. 534 (1991); Johannes H. Wisby, Compressed Air, L.A Times, Nov. 19, 1899, 
at A10; New York Water Supply, Sci. Am., June 4, 1887 at 351 (describing the use of Ingersoll drills in the 
construction of the New York aqueduct). 
18 John A. Byrne, And Then the Bottom Fell Out, Forbes, Feb. 14, 1983, at 142; Paul Klebnikov, A Traumatic 
Experience, Forbes, Jan. 18, 1993, at 83. 
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wn 11 plants.  A 
nd development, 
g, or manufacturing collided with the rapid change in the business environment of the 
1980s.  Armand Ciavatta was a company man of the 1960s who suddenly found himself without 
a co
w Jersey, where 
wn as Ingersoll-
 and engineering 
nia Institute of 
poration came a 
lopment talent it 
uct development 
p.  As one leader 
 star brings forth 
nsiderably more 
en a winner.”19  
 was designed to 
 idea would go 
a that would fail 
ss had become a 
As one engineer 
he idea over the 
ork up a design and toss it 
over another wall to the manufacturing department that would make the product and then heave 
it o  an idea back to 
facturing would 
r prototype was 
problematic that 
al.20 
in New England.  
ine design.  He 
served in the National Guard in an engineering battalion as a training officer and company 
commander.  Later he took classes in mining, tunneling, and heavy construction engineering.  
 an engineer for 
umentation used in 
the first commercial nuclear reactor; he was chief project engineer for the Revere Corporation, 
where he worked with transducers and other force-measuring devices; and he served as Vice 
President of Engineering and Quality Control for Iona Corporation, where he was responsible for 
engineering, development, and testing of the company’s line of kitchen and consumer 
                                                
company laid off 11,900 employees (so that it was down to 35,500) and shut do
corporate culture that favored a stable, if unglamorous, career in research a
marketin
mpany. 
 
The company had a research and development division in Princeton, Ne
Armand Ciavatta worked as a program manager.  The research division, kno
Rand Research, employed researchers with doctoral degrees from top science
programs like the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and the Califor
Technology.  Along with the stability and solidity of the large American cor
bureaucratic culture that perhaps did not make the most of the research and deve
employed.  Cautious managers may have found it easier to nix innovative prod
ideas than to pursue them and risk the embarrassment and career setback of a flo
of a major corporate R & D facility commented years later, “If a rising corporate
a risky innovation that ends up failing, his or her career is apt to be damaged co
than that of the executive who squelches an innovation that could have be
Ingersoll-Rand’s research culture, like that of many corporate R & D facilities,
weed out poor ideas.  It was less concerned with the possibility that a good
undeveloped than that resources would be invested in development of a bad ide
when it hit the market.  But as a consequence, the product development proce
cumbersome affair that could last three or four years from idea to market.  
described it, the marketing department might dream up a product and “toss t
wall” separating marketing and engineering.  Engineering would w
ver yet another wall to sales.  Too often, however, engineering would toss
marketing because the engineers thought the idea was unworkable, or manu
return an idea to engineering for reworking when they thought the design o
flawed.  By the late 1980s, the company thought product design had become so 
it initiated a major overhaul to try to reunite the innovative and the entrepreneuri
 
Armand Ciavatta was born into a working class Italian-American family 
He graduated from Rhode Island School of Design in 1953 with a B.S. in mach
Before coming to Ingersoll-Rand in 1972, he spent twenty years working as
major firms in various capacities; he conducted quality control tests for instr
 
19 John Seely Brown, Foreword to Henry W. Chesbrough, Open Innovation:  The New Imperative for Creating and 
Profiting from Technology (2003). 
20 N. R. Kleinfeld, How ‘Strykeforce’ Beat the Clock, N.Y. Times, Mar. 25, 1990, at section 3 p.1 (Mar. 25, 1990). 
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e employed by Revere Corporation, Ciavatta 
inv 21
of a division of 
research division 
signed Ingersoll-
cted his rights to 
r and, of course, 
ch time as may be mutually agreeable to the COMPANY 
and myself,” the agreement obligated Ciavatta not to “divulge, either during my employment or 
ther rsoll-Rand or of 
any
and assigns, my 
r designs I have 
y or jointly with 
tions, copyrights 
o the research or 
ANY or its affiliates, [check: semi-colon?] or (b) with 
the use of the time, materials or facilities of the COMPANY or any of its affiliates; or (c) 
 result of and is 
thod, substance, 
ned Ciavatta to 
rground mining.  
 of development 
ining and read 
 in research or 
s, which was a 
r of Research, 
potential projects 
beyond those to which they had been assigned.”  The office’s system for handling invention 
ideas was typical of research facilities:  employees were to submit any invention ideas to 
losure forms.”  In his first two years at Ingersoll-Rand Research, Ciavatta 
closures for mining technology and 
instrumentation, several of which were proposals for devices to support or stabilize roofs of 
underground mines.  Most of them used a different principle than Ingersoll-Rand’s friction 
stabilizer; only one disclosure was an improvement to Ingersoll-Rand’s “split-set friction 
stabilizer.”  Ingersoll-Rand chose not to pursue any of his concepts.  Concluding that Ingersoll-
                                                
appliances.  He had also been an inventor: whil
ented and patented a force transducer using strain gauge.   
 
Ciavatta served as the Director of Engineering and Quality Control 
Ingersoll-Rand from 1972 to 1974 before becoming Program Manager for the 
of Ingersoll-Rand in 1974.  Shortly after joining the research division, Ciavatta 
Rand’s form “Agreement Relating to Proprietary Matter,” which broadly restri
use certain knowledge.  In exchange for the symbolic consideration of one dolla
employment by the company “during su
eafter . . . any secret, confidential or other proprietary information” of Inge
 of its many affiliates.  In addition, he agreed: 
 
To assign and I hereby do assign, to the COMPANY, its successors 
entire right, title and interest in and to all inventions, copyrights and/o
made or may hereafter make, conceive, develop or perfect, either solel
others either (a) during the period of such employment, if such inven
and/or designs are related, directly or indirectly, to the business of, or t
development work of the COMP
within one year after termination of such employment if conceived as a
attributable to work done during such employment and relates to a me
machine, article of manufacture or improvements therein within the scope of the business 
of the COMPANY or any of its affiliates.22 
 
In the summer of 1974, the Director of Research, Dr. McGahan, assig
investigate methods of coal haulage, which sparked Ciavatta’s interest in unde
During his four years at Ingersoll-Rand Research, Ciavatta worked on a variety
projects in the mining field. Ciavatta became interested in underground m
extensively in the literature on the subject.  He was never formally involved
development relevant to Ingersoll-Rand’s product for stabilizing mine roof
“friction stabilizer.”  Nevertheless, his boss, Dr. McGahan, the Directo
“encouraged the research staff to be creative, to discuss ideas for projects or 
superiors on “disc
bubbled with ideas.  He submitted thirteen dis
 
21 Ciavatta, 542 A.2d at 881. 
22 Id. at 615; Agreement Relating to Proprietary Matter (copy on file with author). 
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in his innovations, Ciavatta lost his motivation to invent and did not 
sub 23
rsoll-Rand split-
s split down its 
 steel band was 
 Ingersoll-Rand 
 the end, had a 
 McGahan was 
avatta disagreed.  
 argued about it 
udy the problem.  
ed his belief that 
refused to listen.  
im he would be 
l-Rand Research 
e his point.  The 
etal.  He wrote a 
 futile months of 
 a solution.  He 
xt day.24  According to the facts as found by the New Jersey courts, the apparent 
mo top shipments of 
’s superior in the 
ing to Ingersoll-
or relations with 
g with ideas for 
t the idea for the 
 having a light bulb turn on over his head.  He 
had his eureka moment while installing an overhead light fixture in the ceiling of his home in 
wife had picked 
out a new light fixture, and Ciavatta was up on a ladder hanging the fixture from the ceiling 
when he got an idea for a new mine roof stabilizer.  Stabilizers are pounded into holes drilled in 
d the rock surrounding it to reduce 
t along its length 
 ellipse.   
 
 While working on his invention, Ciavatta looked diligently for work but found few 
offers, a situation not unusual for a middle-aged engineer in a recessionary economy.  He took a 
                                                
Rand was not interested 
mit any further disclosures.  
 
 In March 1978, Ciavatta became the manufacturing manager of the Inge
set friction stabilizer.  The stabilizer was a 4-foot length of steel tube that wa
length such that when viewed from the end it looked like a C rather than an O.  A
welded around the circumference of the tube at one end for extra strength. 
customers had been complaining that the stabilizers, particularly the ring at
tendency to split and peel while being driven into the rock roof of a mine. 
convinced that the problem was with the steel used to make the stabilizer.  Ci
He thought the problem was in the design of the tube and the welded ring.  They
for awhile, but McGahan prevailed and assigned Ciavatta and metallurgists to st
A few months of study produced no answer.  In a staff meeting Ciavatta reiterat
the cause of the problem was the radius of the driver, but again McGahan 
According to Ciavatta, McGahan insisted that if Ciavatta continued to defy h
fired.  Frustrated, Ciavatta went to the rock pile at the back of the Ingersol
laboratory and drove stabilizers into granite with two different drivers to prov
test confirmed Ciavatta’s suspicion:  the problem was in the design, not in the m
memo to McGahan and to McGahan’s superiors describing the results of the
testing the metal, documenting his own experiments in the yard, and proposing
was fired the ne
tivation for his abrupt firing was unrelated to the memo:  Ciavatta tried to s
the stabilizer because of his concerns about quality control problems.  Ciavatta
manufacturing program, John Irwin, countermanded Ciavatta’s order.  Accord
Rand, Ciavatta was fired “because of unsatisfactory performance and his po
fellow employees.”25 
 
While looking for a new job, Ciavatta spent his spare time experimentin
inventions, just as he always had.  One day in the summer of 1979, Ciavatta go
invention that sparked the litigation, literally by
August of 1979, about two months after being fired from Ingersoll-Rand.  His 
the roof of a mine and use the friction between the metal an
separation of the rock strata.  Ciavatta’s idea was to use a tube that was not spli
and which had a cross-section shaped like an
 
23 Ciavatta, 542 A.2d at 882; Telephone Interview with Armand Ciavatta, August 3, 2005. 
24 Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. Ciavatta, 509 A.2d 821, 824 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1986); Telephone Interview with 
Armand Ciavatta, August 3, 2005. 
25 Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. Ciavatta, 542 A.2d 879, 883 (N.J. 1988). 
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d that the people 
d unethical or at 
avatta returned to New Jersey, but still could not find a job.  He found it 
humiliating to have to rely on his wife’s income to support the family, but he felt himself 
fort
li tubes from his 
 a neighborhood 
es into the holes 
he tried building 
d, he sought the 
 Ingersoll-Rand 
nt lawyer whom 
 to Ciavatta.  In 
, for a “tubular 
for fastening or for stable mounting in unconsolidated 
und k is compressed 
ively immune to 
nd patent for an 
g, Ciavatta prepared a business plan and sought venture 
capital.  Finding none, he us s plus $125,000 borrowed from his brother and 
from a bank to begin manufacturing the device.   In October 1982, shortly after the patents were 
issu d a few months 
market, and, by 
r 1981, various 
ed memoranda about whether his device was feasible, 
whether it was a competitive threat to any Ingersoll-Rand products, and whether it infringed any 
of the company’s patents to the split-set stabilizer.  About seven months later, in July of 1982, 
 demanding that he assign the patent to the company.  
 stabilizer caught on in the market, Ingersoll-Rand began to 
at. Ingersoll-Rand lowered the price of its split-set stabilizer to 
reflect Ciavatta’s lower price and, in April 1984, filed a suit in the Chancery Division of the New 
Jersey Superior Court for Somerset County.   
 
                                                
job with a firm in Michigan in the winter of 1979–1980, but quit when he learne
running the company were engaged in business practices that Ciavatta considere
least unsavory.  Ci
unate to have that.26   
 
Ciavatta made a sketch of his idea and, to test it, borrowed some cano
wife to stand in for the stabilizers.  He drilled holes in a wooden board and had
boy stand on a bathroom scale holding the board while Ciavatta pushed the tub
and measured the reaction force on the scale.27  When his idea seemed to work, 
a prototype with supplies purchased from a hardware store.  When that worke
advice of counsel about whether the invention was patentable and whether the
Proprietary Agreement would require him to assign it to the company.  The pate
Ciavatta consulted advised him in October 1979 that the patent would belong
March 1980, Ciavatta filed for a patent, which was granted in February 1982
shank [that] can be employed either 
erground strata.”  According to the patent, when driven into a hole, “the shan
from its oblate shape into a nearly circular shape” which “renders the shank relat
vibration or shifting of strata” around the hole.28   Ciavatta received a seco
improvement to the first patent in March 1982.29  
 
While his patents were pendin
ed his life saving
ed, he exhibited his device at the annual mining equipment trade show, an
after that he made his first sale.  Ciavatta’s invention began to catch on in the 
June  1985, his total sales were about $270,000. 
 
Prior Proceedings 
 
When Ingersoll-Rand learned of Ciavatta’s invention in Decembe
Ingersoll-Rand employees exchang
Ingersoll-Rand’s lawyer wrote to Ciavatta
Ciavatta refused.  As Ciavatta’s
perceive it as a competitive thre
 
26 Telephone Interview with Armand Ciavatta, August 3, 2005. 
27 Id. 
28 U.S. Patent No. 4,316,677 (filed Mar. 7, 1980). 
29 U.S. Patent No. 4,322,183 (filed Mar. 4, 1981). 
THE STORY OF INGERSOLL-RAND V. CIAVATTA 
 
   16
ers in New York 
terl, Sutphen & 
alimafde, Kalil, 
alsh, a respected 
ey Superior Court judge for a 
number of years before his death in 2005.  On appeal, Walsh was joined by Stuart M. Feinblatt, 
y effective trial 
ial, the trial judge, William 
D’Annunzio, found that the Proprietary Agreement covered the invention and concluded that the 
es governing the 
s.   
heavily on two 
30 and Whitmyer 
estricting former 
able only to the 
er relationships) 
n agreement by 
sell a competing 
bly necessary to 
protect [the employer’s] legitimate interests, will cause no undue hardship on the defendant, and 
wil ed a preliminary 
rting a business 
  The employee 
e used to prevent 
ent.33 
enforcement of 
oyee to change 
yment prospects 
in the job market,” and “to promote the public interest in the most effective and widespread use 
 skills and limitations.”  Patent assignment agreements, by contrast, have no 
e effect on the employee’s ability to find another job or on the public’s 
the use of employee talent.34  Rather, according to the trial judge, the principal 
r enforcing a patent assignment agreement is “recognition of the sometime 
unstructured, informal and serendipitous processes that lead to invention.  Processes that receive 
their impetus and inspiration from exposure to a subject and interaction with one’s colleagues, 
co-employees and superiors.  A process in which neither secrets nor confidential information 
                                                
Ingersoll-Rand was represented by its corporate counsel and patent lawy
and New Jersey, Mark S. Anderson (now a named partner at Woolson, Gu
Anderson), and James M. Rhodes, Jr. and John M. Calimafde of Hopgood, C
Blaustein & Judlowe.  Ciavatta was represented at the trial level by Charles J. W
trial lawyer in the Newark area who later served as a New Jers
of the New Jersey firm of Sills, Beck, Cummis, Zuckerman, Radin & Tischman. 
 
 In the trial court, notwithstanding what Ciavatta recalled as a ver
performance by Walsh, Ingersoll-Rand prevailed.  After a bench tr
agreement was enforceable under the only relevant New Jersey law, a line of cas
enforceability of contracts restricting post-employment competition by employee
 
Throughout the litigation, both Ciavatta and Ingersoll-Rand relied 
decisions of the New Jersey Supreme Court, Solari Industries, Inc. v. Malady
Brothers, Inc. v. Doyle.31  This pair of decisions had held that covenants r
employees from competing are enforceable only if reasonable and are reason
extent that they prevent an employee from using trade secrets (including custom
and confidential information.  In Solari, the court held that a non-competitio
which a firm sought to restrict a former employee from obtaining a franchise to 
firm’s product in the United States was enforceable only to the extent “reasona
l not impair the public interest.”32  In Whitmyer, the Supreme Court revers
injunction, finding unreasonable an agreement that prevented a plaintiff from sta
that competed with his former employer’s government contracting business.
would use no trade secrets, the court held, and a restrictive covenant could not b
an employee from using general knowledge and trade skills acquired in prior employm
 
Judge D’Annunzio interpreted the Solari-Whitmyer restrictions on the 
restrictive covenants as being designed to “protect the right of an empl
employment and to use his skill, knowledge and experience to further his emplo
of an employee’s
comparable advers
interest in 
rationale fo
 
30 264 A.2d 53  (N.J. 1970). 
31 274 A.2d 577  (N.J. 1971). 
32 264 A.2d at 61. 
33 274 A.2d at 31. 
34 509 A.2d at 828. 
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omic benefits of 
 judge viewed Ciavatta’s case 
as one involving an employee opportunistically claiming as his own the results of a collaborative 
and . 
d not apply to 
and that an employee’s use of  trade secrets was not necessary to enforce a 
hol v leness test to assess the 
con
yment 
r job 
g of knowledge and ideas in the former job 
 employee from finding 
another job 
 expectations of 
ployer. 
a.  He rejected 
rawings done by 
. McGahan, the 
ssible designs for 
h the drawings had been kept in a file 
cabinet to which Ciavatta had access during his employment, the trial judge found insufficient 
evid  the information 
.  It is also clear 
r, continued the 
. . . . T]here does 
 of the holdover 
 everything he knew 
about mine roof stabilizers under the company’s tutelage.  The invention grew directly out of 
Ciavatta’s work, and he owed everything he knew on the subject to Ingersoll-Rand.  “Defendant 
was enriched through his experience with [Ingersoll-Rand]. . . . His enrichment was particularly 
t to the invention in question and came at the hands of an employer possessed of a wealth 
of experience in designing and producing underground mining equipment.”  Moreover, the judge 
reasoned that enforcement of the contract “would not constitute a significant deterrent to a 
change of employment by Ciavatta” because, prior to working for Ingersoll-Rand research, he 
had worked for a number of firms on a variety of different engineering projects. [page cite] 
 
                                                
plays a part.”35  Thus, where Solari-Whitmyer might be read to validate the econ
information spillovers associated with employee mobility, the trial
 collective invention process  thought to characterize the modern research lab
 
Having determined that the Solari-Whitmyer reasonableness test di
holdover agreements 
do er agreement, Judge D’Annunzio applied a multifactor reasonab
tract.  The factors were: 
 
• the degree of relationship between the invention and the former emplo
• whether the invention was based on knowledge acquired in the forme
• the extent of collaborative sharin
• whether enforcement of the agreement would restrict the
• whether enforcement of the agreement would “violate any legitimate
the defendant” or would come as a surprise 
• whether the invention used confidential information of the former em
 
In the trial judge’s estimation, only the last factor favored Ciavatt
Ingersoll-Rand’s argument that Ciavatta had used two allegedly confidential d
James Scott, the inventor of the Ingersoll-Rand split set stabilizer, and Dr
Ingersoll-Rand research division director, which were sketches of alternative po
stabilizers including some elliptical shapes.  Althoug
ence that Ciavatta had seen or copied them.  He also tartly observed that
contained in them was no secret: “There is nothing proprietary about an ellipse
that Dr. Scott was very open and communicative about his ideas.”  Moreove
judge, “plaintiff’s manufacturing process has been in existence for over 50 years
not appear to be anything secret about it or the principles it utilizes.” 
 
What the judge found far more significant in assessing the enforceability
agreement was Ingersoll-Rand’s portrayal of Ciavatta as having learned
relevan
 
35 Id. at 829. 
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 was barred by 
rdering Ciavatta 
years after firing 
uit claiming the 
patent after they 
hat Ciavatta had 
he invention and 
that Ingersoll-Rand had good reason for delaying suit until Ciavatta’s invention became a 
com raint and waited 
Ingersoll-Rand’s 
s the three-part 
s unenforceable 
ship on Ciavatta 
 rsoll-Rand trade 
ineer in his 50’s 
 which might be 
 employment[’] . 
ed period.”36  If 
d claim the fruits of Ciavatta’s creativity, “it is not difficult to appreciate . . . 
why his dismissal by 
ibition, effective 
 industry.   If an 
ay be forced into 
o invalidate the 
on substantially 
t recognized that 
lauses “to foster the free exchange of 
idea ployees will use trade secrets or confidential 
n learned during such interchange to the employer’s disadvantage” after the end of the 
employment.  Her , suggesting that he had not acted 
opportunistically by quitting as soon as he conceived of an invention and that he used no 
confidential information.  Summing up, the appellate division portrayed Ciavatta as using 
ring a new technology to market after he 
was fired.  Such use, the court held, could not be restrained by contract. 
 
This time, Ingersoll-Rand appealed. 
  
The New Jersey Supreme Court Decision 
 
                                                
The trial judge also rejected Ciavatta’s defenses that Ingersoll-Rand
equitable doctrines of estoppel, laches, and unclean hands from an injunction o
to assign the patent.  Ciavatta argued that Ingersoll-Rand had waited nearly five 
him, and nearly four years after learning of his patent application, to file s
invention.  He argued that it would be inequitable to allow them to claim the 
had watched him invest so much time and money into it.  The trial judge found t
not relied on Ingersoll-Rand’s inaction when he decided to go forward with t
petitive threat.  “Plaintiff should not be penalized because it exercised rest
until there was some practical advantage to be gained from litigation.” 
 
Ciavatta appealed.  The appellate division reversed and ordered 
complaint dismissed.  The appellate court held that the proper analysis wa
reasonableness test of Solari and Whitmyer.  Under that test, the agreement wa
because Ingersoll-Rand had no legitimate interest in enforcing it and the hard
was considerable.  The invention, the court explained, did not rely on Inge
secrets or confidential information.  As to hardship, the court said that “an eng
who for one year is required to assign to his former employer any inventions
conceived by him ‘as a result of and attributable to work done during his former
. . most probably will remain unemployed in the same field for the proscrib
Ingersoll-Rand coul
 defendant had such difficulty in locating other employment following 
plaintiff.  The net effect of the agreement is to impose upon the employee a proh
for one year . . . from working on mine supports for any company in the mining
employee does not possess sufficient wealth to bridge the one-year period, he m
a different industry . . . .” 
 
Finally, the appellate division emphasized that Ciavatta did not seek t
holdover clause in order “to bring to fruition for his own benefit an inventi
developed by him or his coemployees during his prior employment.”  The cour
the employer has a legitimate interest in using holdover c
s by its employees without fear that the em
informatio
e, by contrast, Ciavatta was fired
general knowledge and “our free-enterprise system” to b
 
36 Ingersoll-Rand v. Ciavatta, 524 A.2d 866, 869 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. (1987). 
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te Division.  The 
d to the Court by 
 A 1959 graduate 
w, Garibaldi had 
tion, a lawyer in 
 municipal court 
uishable only by 
ce” who seldom 
recedent, and to 
tual rights” who 
ngersoll-Rand v. 
ngersoll-Rand v. 
y disadvantaged 
bs at Princeton 
der the Workers’ 
exposed to toxic 
nt showed some 
tivity to civil liberties; the New Jersey Law Journal remarked that she “generally comes 
down on the side of the First Amendment” in cases involving freedom of the press.  She wrote 
the o withdraw life-
from the Court’s 
without probable 
n for the New Jersey Supreme Court was long, scholarly, and 
tho  the default rule 
ry.  After citing 
ntive employees 
ture on the issue, 
s by contract to 
assign their patents to their employers.”   
f such contracts.  
r and rights of an 
s to invent and 
ers to invest in invention. On the employee side of the dichotomy, the court particularly 
emphasized the need to provide incentives for invention.  The opinion discussed the concern 
                                                
 The New Jersey Supreme Court ruled unanimously to affirm the Appella
opinion was written by Justice Marie Garibaldi.  Justice Garibaldi was appointe
Republican Governor Thomas Kean in 1982 when she was nearly 48 years old. 
of Columbia Law School with a master’s degree in tax from NYU School of La
been a lawyer for the IRS in New York for seven years immediately after gradua
private practice with two Newark, New Jersey law firms for fifteen years, and a
judge for two years.  The New Jersey Law Journal’s guide to the state supreme court described 
her as “the conservative bulwark of a Court whose other members are disting
shades of liberality.”  Yet the paper also described her as an “enigmatic presen
dissented, and whose “opinions show a careful deference to the Legislature, to p
administrative agency interpretations.”  She was “a staunch protector of contrac
generally came down “on the side of business interests,” though notably not in I
Ciavatta.  Justice Garibaldi wrote opinions in a number of cases besides I
Ciavatta showing sensitivity to the rights of employees and other historicall
groups.  She wrote the opinion for the court forcing the all-male eating clu
University to admit women.  She wrote another opinion finding compensable un
Compensation Act claims of psychiatric disability due to fear of having been 
substances in the workplace.  Her opinions both for the Court and in disse
sensi
opinions for the Court in a 1987 trilogy of cases establishing a right t
sustaining treatments in cases of grave illness or brain death, and she dissented 
decision in In re T.L.O., a 1983 decision upholding searches of student lockers 
cause.37 
 
 Justice Garibaldi’s opinio
ughtful, but also characteristically pragmatic.  The opinion began by noting
that an employee’s inventions are his own, absent an agreement to the contra
cases, the court went on to observe that the default rule seldom applies to inve
because, as the court deduced from its survey of case law and law review litera
“most large, technologically advanced companies today require their employee
 
The court then turned to the policy issues associated with enforcement o
Here, the court perceived a “dichotomy of our views on the rights of an invento
employer” and on the public interest in providing incentives for employee
employ
 
37 Ronald J. Fleury, Garibaldi:  A Liberal Dose of Restraint, N.J. L.J., Feb. 17, 1982, at 12.  See also Frank v. Ivy 
Club, 576 A.2d 241  (N.J. 1990) (holding that Princeton eating club’s exclusion of women violates the New Jersey 
Law Against Discrimination); Saunderlin v. E.I. du Pont Co., 508 A.2d 1095 (N.J. 1986) (holding that fear of 
exposure to workplace toxins is a compensable injury under workers compensation); In re Farrell, 529 A.2d 404 
(N.J. 1987) (affirming a right to die when suffering from a terminal illness); In re Subpoena  Issued to Schuman, 552 
A.2d 602  (N.J. 1989) (finding state shield law prevented subpoenaing reporter to whom a crime had been 
confessed). 
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d a Wall Street 
er of inventions 
yed inventors’ 
 the balance was 
coming a more 
overnment research 
labo loyers, therefore, 
er relations.” 
Solari-Whitmyer 
auses.  The court 
yer test in that it 
wn creation,” the 
ation, trade secrets, and, more generally, its 
time and expenditures in training and imparting skills and knowledge to its paid work force,” and 
the novation of the 
 undertake long-
erest, and public 
ldover invention 
quite brief.  The 
n improvements 
sion in which he 
Rand personnel 
irable alternative 
rovements to the 
ntions had been 
as a trade secret 
t Ingersoll-Rand 
 an employee’s 
 weighed and, on 
 and he later developed the product 
based on his general skill and knowledge.  Drawing an analogy to the law of trade secrets, which 
pro ts in competitive 
t of any recent 
 developed over 
fifty years ago and was well known in the industry.”  Based on this, the court concluded that the 
holdover agreement was unenforceable.  Having found such a dearth of evidence to support the 
employer’s interest in claiming the employee’s invention, the court did not need to balance the 
employer’s interest against the employee’s interest or the public interest.   
 
 The court concluded its discussion with two pieces of guidance for future cases.  First, 
the court specifically stated that “the range of the employer’s proprietary information that may be 
protected by contract may narrowly exceed the specific types of information covered by the law 
expressed by some scholars about a decline in patenting by Americans and cite
Journal article stating that Japan “witnessed a dramatic increase in the numb
generated by employed inventors” after the country began tying emplo
compensation to the market value of inventions in 1959.  The employer side of
characterized in terms of the employer’s investment in research:  “It is be
collective research process, the collaborative product of corporate and g
ratories instead of the identifiable work of one or two individuals.  Emp
have the right to protect their trade secrets, confidential information, and custom
 
 The court then canvassed New Jersey law, focusing primarily on the 
rules for restrictive covenants, and the law of other jurisdictions on holdover cl
found the law of other jurisdictions consistent with the three-part Solari-Whitm
focused on the employee’s interest in “enjoying the benefits of his or her o
employer’s interest “in protecting confidential inform
public’s “enormously strong interest in both fostering ingenuity and in
inventor and maintaining adequate protection and incentives to corporations to
range and extremely costly research and development programs.” 
 
 After discussing in general how the employee’s interest, employer’s int
interest should be assessed under the three-factor Solari-Whitmyer test in the ho
context, the court turned to the facts of the case.  The analysis of the facts was 
court began by noting that Ciavatta was not hired to invent or to work on desig
for the stabilizer.  “Ingersoll-Rand did not assign Ciavatta to a ‘think tank’ divi
would likely have encountered on a daily basis the ideas of fellow Ingersoll-
regarding how the split set stabilizer could be improved or how a more des
stabilizer might be designed.”  Not only had he not been directed to invent imp
Ingersoll-Rand stabilizer, the court noted, but all his efforts to suggest inve
rejected.  The court also explained that nothing in the Ingersoll-Rand stabilizer w
or was a product of company research program.  In addition, Ciavatta had not lef
in order to capitalize upon an invention.  Cautioning that “the manner of
departure” is not dispositive, the court nevertheless stated that it is a factor to be
these facts, it weighed in Ciavatta’s favor.  He was fired,
hibits employees from using their employer’s economically valuable secre
employment, the court noted that Ciavatta’s invention was not the produc
Ingersoll-Rand research and, indeed, “the technology Ciavatta employed was
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at the Ingersoll-
y any invention 
soll-Rand was a 
ide, such a provision was substantially broader than 
justified to achieve the purpose of protecting information that the employee would have had 
acc
rst, the nature of 
sing workplace 
t the employer’s 
formation” does 
 are somewhat 
 as a trade secret 
 Although the opinion suggested that a holdover clause would be enforceable 
to the extent it required assignment of post-employment inventions that use trade secrets (which 
was employee could 
ary but does not 
f the departing 
 court, but how 
ns not from their 
ucts to suit their 
s into improved 
s’ modifications 
r employee like 
ason for leaving 
for other employment.  The New Jersey Supreme Court noted that Ciavatta did not leave to 
capitalize on fired unjustly (though that was 
specifically left undecided).  What if Ciavatta had quit out of frustration or boredom after the 
com t to work for a 
 as Ciavatta did, 
to market it at 
The Impact and Importance of Ingersoll-Rand v. Ciavatta 
 Although inventions are a subject of considerable popular interest, the law governing 
employee inventors is somewhat technical and often falls through the disciplinary gap between 
employment law and intellectual property law.  Employment lawyers often regard invention 
assignment agreements as being part of the arcane specialty of patent law, and patent or 
intellectual property lawyers tend to think of the issue as being simply a particular application of 
the law of employment contracts.  As a consequence, the law governing invention assignments is 
                                                
of trade secrets and confidential information.”  Second, the court pointed out th
Rand contract was significantly overbroad in that it claimed for the compan
“within the scope of the company or any of its affiliates,” and since Inger
diversified firm with thirty divisions worldw
ess to and learned in the course of his employment. 
 
 A number of questions were explicitly or implicitly left unanswered.  Fi
the employer’s legally cognizable interest in preventing employees from u
knowledge in post-employment inventions was left undefined.  Suggesting tha
interest may “narrowly exceed” that which is a trade secret or “confidential in
little to clarify the situation, inasmuch as the boundaries of trade secret law
uncertain, and the legal status of “confidential information” that does not qualify
is entirely unclear. 
 not the case with Ciavatta’s stabilizer), it left unclear whether a former 
patent an invention that uses information that the employer claims as propriet
qualify as a trade secret.  
 
Second, the case leaves uncertain the significance of the nature o
employee’s job.  That Ciavatta did not work in R & D clearly mattered to the
much?  Recent research has shown that many firms get some of their innovatio
own R & D employees but from users of their products who modify the prod
own needs.38  The manufacturer then will incorporate the users’ modification
versions of the product.  Would an employee who worked to implement the user
into a new version be treated as a “think tank” sort of person or as a regula
Armand Ciavatta?  A third open question is the significance of the employee’s re
 his idea; he was fired, and he may have been 
pany rejected all his product ideas?  What if the employee promptly wen
competitor or promptly licensed his inventive idea to another firm rather than,
slowly and laboriously developing his product and his own little company 
considerable personal expense? 
 
 
 
38 Eric Von Hippel, Democratizing Innovation (2005). 
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re at, uniformly 
ly ignoring it because they assume it falls into 
someone else’s bailiwick. The fate of the Ingersoll-Rand v. Ciavatta decision after it was handed 
dow
 inventions is the 
y, but ownership 
ies from state to 
 of employment 
ome states, like 
octrine with law 
arching body of 
istinct legal 
aw of invention 
imilarities to the law of trade secrets and restrictive 
covenants, few states have attempted explicitly to link the three areas in the way that Justice 
 likely to have a 
y the number or 
and the lawyers 
ent them, the enforceability of holdover clauses is important and the case is a 
sign and the Supreme 
rk Star-Ledger, 
urt handed down 
 few other notes 
rties was neither 
sensational nor substantial, the long-term importance of the case was greater than a simple 
sey courts on the 
greements, with 
ted as well in nine other 
of appeals with 
followed by state 
the case as most 
                                                
a topic that intellectual property and employment lawyers tend vaguely to gestu
acknowledging its importance yet still essential
n in June of 1988 perfectly illustrates this phenomenon. 
 
 One obstacle to the greater salience of the law of ownership of employee
disparate sources of law governing the issue. Federal law governs patent validit
of employee inventions is governed exclusively by state law, and the law var
state.  As noted above, several states have statutes regulating the enforceability
agreements governing employee inventions, while most rely on common law.  S
New Jersey in Ingersoll-Rand, have explicitly blended the employee invention d
governing trade secrets and restrictive covenants in a way that creates an over
rules regulating ownership of workplace knowledge.  But most states have d
doctrines regulating the different areas.  Thus, although in some states the l
assignment agreements has certain s
Garibaldi did in Ingersoll-Rand.  For all these reasons, no one single decision is
large impact, and Ingersoll-Rand v. Ciavatta did not, at least as measured b
length of law review or judicial discussions of it. 
 
Nevertheless, in the quotidian world of inventors and their employers 
who repres
ificant precedent.  Not surprisingly, therefore, both the Appellate Division 
Court’s decisions were reported in the New Jersey Law Journal and the Newa
though it was hardly front-page news.39  In the year or so after the Supreme Co
its decision, one student published a case note on it, and in the following years a
mentioned it.40 
 
 Although the immediate impact of the case for people other than the pa
citation count might suggest.   The case remains a leading citation in New Jer
enforceability of both invention assignment agreements and non-compete a
fifteen New Jersey cases relying on it since 1988.  It has been ci
decisions from around the country and the Federal Circuit (the federal court 
exclusive jurisdiction over appeals from Patent Office decisions). It has been 
supreme courts in Iowa, Maine, and Washington. Judges have tended to regard 
 
39 Kathy Barrett Carter, Inventor Wins Ruling Against Former Employer, Newark Star-Ledger (n.d.); Kathy Barrett 
Carter, State Court Voids Pact Restricting Ex-Employee’s Use of Information, Newark Star-Ledger, June 23, 1988, 
at 39; Kathy Barrett Carter, When the Good News Arrives a Bit Too Late, N.J. L.J., July 21, 1988, at 12. 
40 Hanna Bui-Eve, Note, To Hire or Not to Hire:  What Silicon Valley Companies Should Know About Hiring 
Competitors’ Employees, 48 Hastings L.J. 981 (1997); Kenneth F. D’Amato, Note, Employer Not Entitled to 
Enforcement of Holdover Agreement Where He Does Not Have a Proprietary Interest in Conceiving the Invention—
Ingersoll Rand v. Ciavatta, 19 Seton Hall L. Rev. 947 (1988); Marc Hershovitz, Note, Unhitching the Trailer 
Clause:  The Rights of Inventive Employees and Their Employers, 3 J. Intell. Prop. L. 187 (1995); Domenick 
Carmagnola, The Changing Landscape of Restrictive Covenants, N.J. L.J., June 24, 1996, at 10. 
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f both invention 
 have emphasized 
the aspect of the opinion that arguably broadened the employer’s legitimate interest in preventing 
emp nformation.41   
decision was its 
nd trade secrets.  
 the Solari and 
d reasonableness 
r the control of 
ace knowledge.  That approach has meant that Ciavatta has been 
as s roduces more 
area of law that 
th of its impact, 
ew.  Multifactor 
 take an extreme 
pansive view of 
are enforceable; 
qually clear and 
is an area where 
most judges (and the handful of legislatures that have weighed in on the problem) believe that a 
st depend on the 
over clauses are 
invention relates 
it seems.  Under 
r is sufficiently 
significant for its development of the multi-factor test for the enforceability o
assignment agreements and restrictive covenants, whereas law review articles
loyees from patenting in areas where the employer has valuable proprietary i
 
 One of the principal jurisprudential accomplishments of the Ciavatta 
melding of the law of holdover clauses with the law of restrictive covenants a
The court’s multi-factor reasonableness analysis, which explicitly relied on
Whitmyer decisions in the restrictive covenant area, attempted to create a unifie
rule to govern a wide range of disputes between employees and firms ove
economically valuable workpl
ignificant for its contribution to the law of restrictive covenants (an area that p
published decisions) as it has been to the law of holdover agreements (an 
produces fewer published decisions).   
 
On the merits of the court’s approach, as opposed to simply the bread
reasonable minds might differ, but the court’s approach reflects the majority vi
reasonableness tests are particularly appealing to judges who are unprepared to
view in one direction or another.  For example, judges with an extremely ex
employer rights could take a bright-line position that all holdover agreements 
those with an extremely expansive view of employee rights could adopt an e
easily administrable rule that such agreements are never enforceable.  But this 
middle course is preferable, and that the justice of enforcing such agreements mu
facts.  Even California’s statute, which appears to create a clear rule that hold
unenforceable except when the employee uses the employer’s materials or the 
to the employer’s current or possible R & D, may not be as clear a rule as 
California law, the court would have to decide whether Ciavatta’s stabilize
                                                 
41 See, e.g., Maw v. Advanced Clinical Commc’ns, 846 A.2d 604 (N.J. 2004) (holding that graph
refusing to sign a 2-year non-compete not entitled to relief under New Jersey’s “Conscientious E
Act”); Lamorte Burns & Co. v. Walters, 770 A.2d 1158 (N.J. 2001) (finding marine insurance in
legally protectable interest in client names and information and therefore was entitled to summary
compete, duty of loyalty, and trade secret claims); Johnson v. Benjamin Moore & Co, 788 A.2d
App. Div. 2002) (holding paint company not liable to person who submitted a new product idea
the proposition that novelty is not a requirement for a trade secret but that novelty is a requirem
misappropriation of a submitted idea); Morris Silverman Mgt. Corp. v. W. Union Fin. Servs., 
(D. Ill. 2003); Freedom Wireless v. Boston Commc’ns, 220 F. Su
ic designer fired for 
mployee Protection 
vestigative firm had 
 judgment on non-
 906 (N.J. Super. Ct. 
, citing Ciavatta for 
ent for a claim for 
284 F. Supp. 2d 964 
pp. 2d 16 (D. Mass. 2002) (pre-invention 
assignment agreements should be construed narrowly, therefore space technology company not entitled to patent to 
a pre-paid cellular calling card system developed by former employee); Campbell Soup Co. v. Destanick, 58 F. 
Supp. 2d 477 (D.N.J. 1999); Laidlaw v. Student Transp. Inc., 20 F. Supp. 2d 727 (D.N.J. 1998); Neveux v. Webcraft 
Techs., Inc., 921 F. Supp. 1568 (D. Mich. 1996); Campbell Soup v. ConAgra, Inc., 801 F. Supp. 1298 (D.N.J. 1991) 
(upholding a holdover contract against a former product development technologist, but concluding that the patented 
techniques for a new frozen chicken product were not covered by the contract), vacated on other grounds, 977 F.2d 
86 (3d Cir. 1992); Revere Transducers, Inc. v. Deere & Co., 595 N.W.2d 751 (Iowa 1999) (upholding claim against 
former employees who prepared designs that incorporated Revere’s confidential information and disclosed that 
information to Deere, a Revere customer, after going to work for Revere); Bernier v. Merrill Air Eng’rs, 770 A.2d 
97 (Maine 2001); Waterjet Tech., Inc. v. Flow Int’l Corp., 996 P.2d 598 (Wash. 2000). 
THE STORY OF INGERSOLL-RAND V. CIAVATTA 
 
   24
ring in the same 
 the relationship 
 to enforce the 
this is an area of 
y and simplify.  
t makes up for in 
 extent that the 
greater coherence 
and pragmatism to the effort to identify the employer, employee, and public interests in the 
enf of law that was 
ic formalism.42 
to draw the line 
e free to use in 
atents, and that 
ported decisions 
s of the case, and 
ctual distinctions 
l policy debates 
over whether an 
agreement could 
ation that violate 
gn an overbroad 
id not implicate public policy, 
although the court also noted that the particular non-compete in question was not incompatible 
with a clear mandate of public policy.  The court also stated that if the employee could not 
neg nd then disputed 
.  This suggests 
ements as being 
 
 
n stabilizer and 
iavatta remained 
courts to do real 
e thing again, his disaffection with the law is clear: 
                                                
closely related to Ingersoll-Rand’s business.  One imagines that a court might b
fairness concerns that the New Jersey court considered in deciding whether
between Ciavatta’s invention and Ingersoll-Rand’s business was close enough
agreement.  The effort to do justice in the particular case, however, has made 
law that has proven remarkably resistant over the years to efforts to clarif
However, what a multifactor reasonableness test lacks in the way of certainty, i
its explicit focus on the need to accommodate conflicting policies.  To the
opinion’s analytic approach has caught on in other jurisdictions, it has brought 
orcement of these contracts.  That is a worthy accomplishment in a field 
previously characterized, at least in some states, by uncertain standards and archa
 
 Controversy remains both in New Jersey and elsewhere about where 
between the knowledge that employees gain on the job which they should b
subsequent employment, including in the development of post-employment p
knowledge which the prior employer may claim as proprietary.  Many of the re
resolve the issue, as the New Jersey Supreme Court did, based on particular fact
the various results reached by different decisions often can be explained by fa
about the circumstances of the invention and the employment.  Yet fundamenta
persist.  As recently as 2004, the New Jersey Supreme Court sharply divided 
employee who was fired for refusing to sign a possibly overbroad non-compete 
recover under a New Jersey statute prohibiting some forms of wrongful termin
public policy.43 The majority concluded, over a sharp dissent, that a refusal to si
non-compete agreement was a purely private dispute that d  
otiate a narrower non-compete agreement, she could have signed it anyway a
its enforceability when and if the employer attempted to enforce it against her
that at least some members of the court regarded overbroad non-compete agre
less obnoxious to the public interest than other illegal contract terms might be. 
Conclusion 
 
 More than twenty-five years after Armand Ciavatta invented his frictio
seventeen years after the New Jersey Supreme Court ruled in his favor, C
resolute about the justice of his position but disappointed by the failure of the 
justice.  Though he said he would do the sam
 
42 For a survey of the legal doctrine on the enforceability of non-compete agreements, see Brian M. Malsberger, 
Covenants Not to Compete:  A State-by-State Survey (3d ed.2002).  For an example of legislation regulating the 
enforcement of pre-invention assignment agreements, see Cal. Lab. Code § 2870 (2005) and Cubic Corp. v. Marty, 
229 Cal. Rptr. 828 (Ct, App. 1986).  Under the California statute, a pre-invention assignment agreement is 
unenforceable if the employee did not use the employer’s equipment or information, the employee developed the 
invention on his or her own time, and the invention does not relate to the employer’s business.  That standard largely 
replicates the common law rule. 
43 Maw v. Advanced Clinical Commc’ns, 846 A.2d 604 (N.J. 2004). 
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ductive elements 
ut of business.  I 
ntil the financial 
iversity of South 
of an improved 
fter defying the 
viction, he even 
o accept a pardon from the Florida governor because to do so, he said, would be an 
implicit admission of his guilt.  The endless legal wrangling prompted his wife to leave him, 
abo portant than our 
, or in his life, 
 least in the field 
nd the individual 
 is not unique to 
ed and fortunes 
pent most of the 
otton gin prosecuting dozens of patent infringement 
cases that brought him no relief from his fear that others were pirating his ideas.  The dogged 
dete ir ideas suggests 
 others feel that 
hts confirm the 
t be right about 
the country by 
orsky differed in 
respects, in neither case did the heart of their arguments rest on the long-term national 
interest in encouraging innovation as much as their own strong attachment to their own inventive 
work.  The law cannot ignore the psychic and emotional costs suffered by employees who feel 
that depriving them of their patents is akin to depriving them of parts of themselves.  But their 
tenacity is revealing.  Fundamentally, the law governing employee innovators and regulating the 
control over workplace knowledge has influenced and will continue to influence where 
innovation comes from and how society balances entrepreneurship and innovation, security and 
                                                
“unfortunately for me and others the law is used to punish the creative and pro
in our society.”  In his view, the “sole purpose of the litigation was to put me o
won the verdict.  I lost my business with a better product.  This will not stop u
penalties for this kind of litigation [are] significant.”44  Petr Taborsky, the Un
Florida lab technician who went to jail rather than relinquish his invention 
method for using clay to extract ammonia from water, told a similar story.  A
court order to relinquish his ideas and losing the appeal of his criminal con
refused t
ut which Taborsky bitterly remarked, “I decided that the case was more im
marriage.”45 
 
 Ciavatta’s lament about the failures of law to do justice in his case
identifies one of the most significant failings in our system of civil litigation, at
of employment.  Litigation is often ruinously expensive for the small business a
litigant.  Remedies, when they come at all, often come too late.  The problem
employment litigation.  Stories of creative inventors whose lives were ruin
squandered in patent litigation are as old as Eli Whitney, who is said to have s
money he made from his patents on the c
rmination of these inventors to claim both the credit and the control over the
that what is at stake is more than money.  At a basic level, these inventors and
their creativity is essential to who they are and that intellectual property rig
importance of the mark they have made in the world. 
 
 Of course, the Ciavattas and Taborskys of this world may or may no
whether protecting their rights to patents serves the long-term interest of 
encouraging more inventions. Although the circumstances of Ciavatta and Tab
significant 
free inquiry.  
 
44 Letter from Armand Ciavatta to Catherine Fisk (undated; summer 2005). 
45 Leon Jaroff, Intellectual Chain Gang, Time, Feb. 10, 1997, at 64. 
